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Abstract 
 
We propose a measure of the probability of crises associated with an aggregate 
indicator, where the percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals can 
be combined to give an appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this 
perspective, the important issue is not only to determine whether a system produces true 
predictions of a crisis, but also whether there are forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis 
prior to its actual occurrence. To this end, we adopt the approach initiated by Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), analyzing each indicator and calculating each threshold 
separately. We depart from this approach in that each country is also analyzed separately, 
permitting the creation of a more “custom-made” early warning system for each one. 
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A FOREWARNING INDICATOR SYSTEM FOR FINANCIAL CRISES : 
THE CASE OF SIX CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
 
 The proliferation of financial crises in the emerging economies during the nineties led  
economists to spend great efforts in the building of forewarning indicator systems that could 
help prevent the detrimental effects of financial turbulence and assist policymakers in taking 
appropriate actions. In the literature, several modeling approaches have been suggested as 
frameworks for forecasting financial crises. The so-called first generation models focus on the 
factors that generate currency crises : balance of payments crises as described by Krugman 
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984); speculative attack models based on investors’ 
expectations of monetary policy; financial bubble models with moral hazard behaviors (see 
Krugman, 1998). Second generation models suggest that the occurrence of financial crises is a 
consequence of contagion channels : commercial trade, portfolio re-allocations, political 
channels (see, among others, Eichengreen et al. (1996), Sachs et al. (1996), Glick and Rose 
(1998), Bussière and Fratzscher (2002), Komulainen and Lukkanila (2002)). Third generation 
models use empirical-based methodologies. They are based on value at risk analysis, 
logit/probit regressions, Early Warning Systems, and  Markovian models (see, among many 
others, Burkart and Coudert (2002), Abiad (2003), Kumar et al. (2003)). 
 In this paper we adopt the last approach by proposing a measure of the probability of 
crises associated with an aggregate indicator, where the percentage of false alarms and the 
proportion of missed signals are combined to give an appreciation of the vulnerability of an 
economy. In this perspective, the important issue is not only to determine whether a system 
produces true predictions of a crisis, but also whether there are forewarning signs of a 
forthcoming crisis prior to its actual occurrence. To this end, we adopt a signal extraction 
approach, following the methodology suggested in previous papers by Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Patillo (1999), Goldstein et al. (2000), and Edison (2003). 
However, our interpretation contrasts with previous studies in the conception of what a good 
warning system must be for an emerging economy. It is common wisdom that in constructing 
warning systems, economists usually face a dilemma. On one hand, they attempt to construct 
a system that yields a high percentage of correctly predicted crises : in this case, the 
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counterpart is a high proportion of false crisis signals. On the other hand, they try to minimize 
the proportion of false signals, and in this case, they must also accept a low proportion of 
good crisis predictions. In the case of the countries treated in this study, a monitoring system 
with a high proportion of false crisis signals is not necessarily something bad, since it may 
simply mean that the warning system detects situations of increased vulnerability in a context 
of deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. An intertemporal accumulation of false signals 
can indicate a high probability that a severe crisis will actually occur in the near future. 
Therefore, false alarms may simply indicate the deterioration of economic fundamentals and 
potential forthcoming crises. We propose such an indicator system in this paper and show that 
the predicted probabilities of a currency crisis in Russia and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, 
have remained high during the nineties. In contrast, a comparison with other Central and 
Eastern European countries (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) reveals that 
the probabilities of a crisis were high only a few periods prior to the observed crises and low 
otherwise.  
 The forewarning model we propose differs with respect to several aspects when compared 
to other models based on the signal extraction approach. The main differences are threefold.  
 Firstly, we choose the real exchange rate instead of the nominal exchange rate for the 
market pressure index. Many papers dealing with the signal extraction approach consider the 
nominal exchange rate to define the market pressure index that identifies crisis episodes. 
However, it is important to note that our study concerns countries which went through a 
transition period at the beginning of the 1990s and adopted, throughout the years, many 
different exchange rate regimes, many of them fixed. The historical volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate in these counties, which is quite low, would hinder the correct identification of 
crisis episodes, a “crisis” being defined as a sudden and marked depreciation of the exchange 
rate (and/or a rapid loss of reserves). For this reason, we substitute the real exchange rate for 
the nominal one, which we believe gives a more realistic view of the occurrence of turbulence 
episodes. 
 Secondly, we use quarterly data, rather than annual or monthly data. An annual periodicity 
is not informative enough of financial phenomena that occur at infra-annual frequencies. 
Further, with annual data, one is unable to predict whether a crisis happened in the beginning 
or in the end of the year. Monthly data would be better, but are not available for many ‘real 
variables’. Besides, a monthly periodicity introduces the problem of autoregressive effects 
with possibly complicated lag structures. 
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 Thirdly, we compare the pooling model to a country-specific approach. Though the 
pooling estimations might imply some advantages as far as the power of the results is 
concerned, they are not as appropriate in the presence of an heterogeneous group of countries. 
This is the case here : we find differences between Kazakhstan and Russia on one hand and 
the other countries on the other hand. Country-specific forewarning systems have been 
applied successfully in the empirical literature to Asian and Latin American emerging 
economies (see Edison (2003)). Here, the approach is extended to emerging economies in 
Eastern and Central Europe.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents ten macroeconomic leading 
indicators and shows that their behavior differs around crisis periods. In Section 3, a 
composite indicator is proposed to estimate the probability of a crisis. Finally, Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Single leading indicators for predicting the financial crises 
 
 The methodological approach draws upon the works of Kaminsky et al. (1998), though 
some modifications and extensions are considered. Financial crises can manifest themselves 
in several ways : currency crises, banking system collapses, high increase of short-term debt, 
pressure on the domestic interest rate markets, high inflationary periods yielding financial 
bubbles, etc. As shown in the aforementioned paper, one of the cornerstones of financial 
turbulence in emerging markets is the observation of severe pressure on the domestic 
currency with high costs on the external balance. Their work focuses on a mix of developed 
and emerging economies using data from 1970 to 1997. They find that banking and currency 
crises do arrive with some early warnings, though their model has a better predictive power 
for the latter than for the former. 
 We adopt a criterion for the definition of a crisis that accounts for both pressures 
occurring in the exchange rate market and diminishing foreign reserves. The market pressure 
index is defined as follows: 
 
   
ttt
RESERVREERIND ∆−∆=
21
φφ  (1) 
 
where REER is the real exchange rate and RESERV stands for the country’s foreign reserves. 
As argued in the introduction, the real exchange rate – rather than the nominal one – gives a 
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more realistic view of turbulence episodes in the emerging economies considered here. This 
avoids a ‘mis-identification’ of crises, that may or may not be detected, according to the 
different exchange rate regimes that were in place during the period under examination. 
Market pressure is observed when the real exchange rate depreciates and when a country is 
confronted with reserve losses.  
 A financial crisis is then defined as follows:  
 
   



≥
=
otherwise
cINDif
crisis
t
t
,0
,1
 (2) 
 
 A crisis occurs when pressures in the exchange rate market and foreign reserve losses are 
very high. By ‘high’, one means that exchange rate depreciation and foreign reserve losses 
have reached a threshold value above which their continued decline is not sustainable. The 
identification of a crisis is thus conditioned by three important parameters, c,,
21
φφ . The latter 
must be parameterized (or sometimes estimated) by the modeler. It is common wisdom to 
interpret the weights 
21
, φφ  as measures of the volatility of the changes occurring in the real 
exchange rate and foreign reserves. We normalize 
1
φ  to 1 and define 
2
φ  as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the rate of change of the real exchange rate and the standard deviation of  
foreign reserve variation : 
RESERVREER ∆∆= σσφ /2 . The threshold parameter is thus defined as  
 
   
IND
INDc δσ+=
______
 (3) 
 
where 
______
IND  is the empirical mean of IND and 
IND
σ  is the standard deviation. A crisis occurs 
when the indicator is δ  standard deviations above its mean. C must be determined optimally, 
in such a way that the crises identified correspond, at least, to the observed episodes of 
currency crises in the exchange rate markets. The choice of δ  deserves some further 
consideration. This value is not fixed in an ad-hoc manner by adopting, for instance, the 
conventional choice of a value between 2.5 and 3 standard deviations. We instead implement 
a grid-search methodology, by considering a great number of values of δ  in the interval [0,3]. 
Ideally, we consider the percentiles of δ in this interval. The value that is finally retained is 
the one that best reproduces the actual crisis history of the countries under study. We find that 
the value 0.75 correctly identifies the crises. For illustration purposes, Figures 1 and 2 provide 
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the graphs for crisis identification in Russia for 
75.0=δ  and 1=δ . The value 1 does detect 
some crisis episodes, but we lose several observations of turbulence per country. The value 
0.75 best corresponds to these countries’ crisis history, but it is also important to stress here 
that the objective of this paper is not only to develop a forewarning system for crises in the 
strict sense, but more importantly, to detect situations of increased vulnerability. When 
5.2=δ , no crisis is detected for any country, although currency crises did actually occur 
during the years under study
5
. With this objective in mind, it seems logical to use a value of 
delta that is lower than the one usually used in the literature. 
 Our study covers the period starting from the first quarter of 1996 and ending at the last 
quarter of 2003. We use quarterly data for the following countries : Russia, Hungary, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. Our series are taken from the IMF 
database (IFS statistics). A detailed description of the variables used is given in the appendix. 
 
Evidence of crises provided by the Market Pressure Index 
 
 Figure 1 shows signs of tension in 1996. Furthermore, the market pressure index crosses 
its threshold value twice from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999. The index as defined 
above has the following advantage. Not only does it detect the year 1998 as a crisis period, 
but it also corroborates the observation that in Russia the 1998 crisis did not appear suddenly, 
but was the height of an economic crisis that lasted many years (cumulative decline in GDP 
by more than 40% between 1989 and 1996, near-hyperinflation) in a context of failure of the 
reform strategies undertaken during the transition period. Indeed, macroeconomic 
fundamentals began to seriously deteriorate in 1996 and 1997 and this was the consequence of 
a combination of factors: deterioration of the terms of trade, a fall in oil prices, sharp 
depreciation of the Ruble, increases in interest rates and internal problems (fiscal and debt 
crises).  
 Figures 3-7 depict the case of the other five countries. The Russian crisis and the 
slowdown of the Western European countries’ economies had a negative impact on the 
Central and Eastern European countries’ exports, as well as Foreign Direct Investment, 
thereby inducing an important slowdown of their activity from 1998 onwards. Moreover, 
internal issues such as faster growth and higher inflation, as well as fiscal problems, put 
pressures on these countries’ exchange rates. Contagion channels have also been important in 
                                  
5
 To avoid too many graphs, we only report this example. Other similar examples with different values of δ for 
the different countries are available upon request to the authors.  
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explaining financial market turmoil. Figure 7 gives a good illustration of contagion in 
Kazakhstan. As one can see, the market pressure index has crossed its threshold several times 
between the first quarter of 1998 and the end of 1999, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. 
This can be expected, given the relations and closeness of the two economies. A similar 
observation could apply to Hungary, Poland and the Slovak and Czech Republics, though the 
contagion effects have been delayed over time. The graphs corroborate the historical 
observation that these countries have continued to suffer from contagion effects in the 2000’s. 
It is also important to note that the index gives evidence of the influence of the 1997 Czech 
crisis (triggered by speculative attacks due to weakening fundamentals and the Asian crisis), 
which encouraged the CEECs to move towards greater exchange rate flexibility. 
 
Economic indicators 
 
 A central question in the signaling approach is the choice of the crises’ potential 
determinants. For the countries examined in this paper, we consider different categories of 
explanatory variables:  
 
• a monetary variable : the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP. The upper bound is considered for 
this variable, because expansionary monetary policy and/or a decline in GDP are associated 
with the onset of a crisis.  
• a capital account variable: the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.  We take into 
account the upper bound for this variable, because expansionary monetary policy and/or sharp 
declines in reserves usually precede financial crises.  
• current account variables : 
- the real exchange rate : lower bound, for real exchange rate overvaluations (-) are linked 
to currency crises.  
- the value of exports and imports : lower bound for exports and upper bound for imports, 
because a weak external sector is part of a currency crisis.  
- the current account balance measured as the ratio of the difference of exports and imports 
to GDP : lower bound, for the aforementioned reasons.  
• real sector indicators : GDP and GDP growth. The lower bound is considered for both 
these variables, due to the fact that recessions often precede financial crises. 
• banking variables :  
- commercial bank deposits : lower bound, for a loss of deposits occurs as a crisis unfolds. 
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- the ratio of domestic credit to GDP : upper bound, since credit expands prior to a crisis 
and contracts afterwards. 
 Banking system collapses often coincide with the onset of a currency crisis. For example, 
the biggest difference between Russia and other Eastern European countries was the role of 
the banking system. In the former, credits have continued to be inefficiently directed towards 
the big state-owned industrialized conglomerates, bad loans worsened and the absence of 
supervisory laws induced high inflation and the development of a barter economy. In contrast, 
in Central and Eastern Europe monetary authorities imposed a control of credits that was part 
of a tightening monetary policy, signaling the authorities’ intention to address appropriately 
their inflation problem. Such a decision was positively interpreted by the markets and helped 
assessing the credibility of the monetary policy. In view these observations, it seems 
interesting to include among the set of leading indicators a macroeconomic variable that 
captures the influence of banking crises. Here, we use commercial bank deposits and the ratio 
of credits to GDP as proxies. The decrease of commercial bank deposits or the rapid 
expansion of credits are two vectors of banking crises. 
 The important issue here is the stability of the financial sector, as is highlighted in  third 
generation currency crisis models. The motivation behind such a choice is rather intuitive. 
The Russian crisis was part of a huge financial crisis characterized by a weak banking sector 
and several bankruptcies of financial intermediaries. For the other countries, the reasons for 
choosing variables that reflect the stability of the financial sector are similar to those evoked 
when considering the currency crises in the South-East Asian countries: the degree of the 
severity and spread of a currency crisis occurring in a neighboring country depends upon the 
fragility of  their own financial markets, or in other words, the strength of the banking sector.  
 The above variables can be considered as forewarning indicators of a forthcoming 
financial crisis for several reasons. First, prior to a crisis, domestic credit tends to increase and 
the rapid growth of credit is transformed into a sharp contraction when the crisis appears. 
Furthermore, credit expansion is usually observed in the context of an expansionary monetary 
policy inducing an increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP. Second, a currency crisis generally 
follows a sharp deterioration of the external balance : loss of competitiveness, current account 
deficits and foreign reserve losses. Third, an unstable economic situation is a vector of 
financial crises. Finally, in a context of immature banking sectors, crisis episodes are 
accompanied by losses of commercial bank deposits.  
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Computing noise-to-signal ratios for single indicators 
 
 We consider an on/off signal and a variable, S
t
, that takes the value 1 if a crisis is signaled 
and 0 otherwise. The prediction of a crisis or a calm period depends upon the behavior of a 
macroeconomic variable. A crisis signal is detected when this variable deviates from its usual 
values beyond a certain threshold level:  
 
   





<
≥
=
XX
XXif
Ssignal
t
t
t
,0
,1
:  (4) 
 
where X is a macroeconomic variable. Note that we need a signaling horizon, that is the time 
horizon at which a variable is expected to predict a crisis. In this paper, we consider a 
signaling period of four quarters. To define the optimal value of the threshold X , we proceed 
as follows. Consider the following events:  
 
 A: the variable predicts a crisis and the crisis occurs within four quarters (good ‘on’ signal)  
 B: the variable predicts a crisis, but no crisis occurs during the signaling period (false crisis 
signal)  
 C: the variable does not predict a crisis, but a crisis occurs (missed crisis signal or false calm 
signal)  
 D: The variable does not predict a crisis and no crisis occurs (good ‘off’ signal)  
 
 These four situations are summarized in the following matrix: 
 
Indicator Performance 
 Crisis within four quarters No crisis within four quarters 
Signal issued by indicator 
A B 
No signal issued by indicator 
C D 
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We define the following test:  





occurnotdoescrisisaH
against
occurscrisisaH
:
:
1
0
 
 
or  

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
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DBH
against
CAH
:
:
1
0
 
 
 A type I error of this test is the probability of rejecting 
0
H  when it is true and is defined 
as )/( CACP ∪ . A type II error is the probability of accepting 
0
H  when 
1
H  is true, that is 
)/( DBBP ∪ . The noise-to-signal ratio is defined as the ratio of type II errors over 1 minus 
type I errors : 
 
   
)/(
)/(
)/(1
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CAAP
DBBP
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DBBP
∪
∪
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∪−
∪
=α
 (5) 
 
 The noise-to-signal ratio is thus the ratio of false signals to good signals. A 
macroeconomic variable is considered as a good warning indicator of a currency crisis if this 
ratio has values near 0. Accordingly, the threshold X , to be selected, must minimize the 
above ratio. To do this, we use the quantiles of the variable X and retain those yielding the 
lowest value of α . We also compute the probability of correctly predicting a crisis : 
 
   
)(
)(
BAP
AP
∪
=β
 (6) 
 
Performance of  economic indicators 
 
 Tables 2-8 display the results for the six countries (pooling and individual countries). 
Column 1 reports the quantiles corresponding to the minimum noise-to-signal ratio for each 
indicator. In all cases, the quantiles chosen vary with the macroeconomic indicator under 
consideration. Generally, we could say that for the countries where the quantiles chosen are, 
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in majority, situated below Q5, the proportion of observations corresponding to crises in 
higher in comparison with those of the periods considered as tranquil. As a consequence, the 
risk of emitting false signals of future calm periods (or missed signals) is low. When the 
majority of quantiles chosen is situated above Q5, the conclusion is the opposite. As a high 
value for the threshold increases the proportion of tranquil periods, the risk of emitting false 
signals of calm periods is increased.  
 Column 3 reports the noise-to-signal ratio. The indicators have a good explanatory power 
if the ratio is lower than 1. As seen, this is the case for a majority of variables for the six 
countries.  
The pooling approach is the same as the country-specific approach, except that  we pool 
together the data for all the countries in order to estimate the threshold for each indicator. The 
threshold chosen is that which minimizes the noise to signal ratio when we consider at the 
same time the number of As, Bs, Cs and Ds (see the above matrix and the method for the 
minimization of the NTS ratio) for all countries. These are calculated relative to the percentile 
distribution of the indicator, by country. In the end, the percentile threshold chosen will be the 
same for all countries for a given indicator, but the actual value will vary across countries 
(since the distributions are not the same).  
 As far as the pooling approach is concerned (see Table 2), we can observe that the best 
three indicators are the REER, with an NTS ratio of 0,05, the Current Account, and 
Commercial Bank Deposits. The good performance of the REER indicator corroborates what 
is usually found in the literature, and is also in line with the findings for the country-specific 
approach. Among the worst-performing indicators are Imports, Growth, and M2/GDP. Even 
in the country-specific approach, these indicators were not generally found to perform very 
well. 
 Generally speaking, the overall performance of the indicators from an NTS ratio point of 
view is not significantly improved, compared to the country-specific approach. But what we 
can observe is that the percentage of crises correctly called has even worsened. For example, 
the second-best indicator, the Current Account, only calls correctly about 20% of crises. On 
the other hand, the imports indicator called more than 80% of crisis episodes, yet its 
performance is not very good from an NTS ratio point of view. This performance could 
possibly be attributed to the fact that the pooling approach is more restrictive, in that it 
privileges the avoidance of bad crisis signals over the possibility of having more signals 
indicating situations of increased vulnerability. This confirms that the country-specific 
approach might suit better the purposes of this study.  
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 Let us now comment the results for individual countries (country-specific approach). For 
Russia, a bad score is reported by the indicator M2/GDP. This is understandable in a context 
where the degree of intermediation of the economy is very weak. A better score is obtained by 
the real exchange rate, a conclusion that is in line with the usual findings in the empirical 
literature, and the best scores are obtained by GDP, exports and commercial bank deposits. 
Though the ratio is lower than 1 for a majority of variables, it seems quite difficult to find 
indicators with a high degree of reliability in the prediction of financial crises in Russia. This 
is seen in the fourth column of Table 3, where the ratio of crises accurately predicted has a 
rather limited explanatory power for several variables, though not those displaying the lowest 
noise-to-signal ratios. These findings for Russia corroborate what was observed historically, 
namely, the difficulty for multilateral international organizations to anticipate the 1998 crisis 
and to construct reliable forewarning systems.  
 For Hungary, the best indicators in terms of noise-to-signal ratios are imports and the 
REER, which also give  satisfactory scores in terms of percentage of correctly called crises 
and probability of crisis when a warning signal is emitted by these indicators. As far as 
Poland is concerned, the best indicators are exports and commercial bank deposits, and for the 
Slovak Republic, it is the commercial bank deposits variable, the REER and M2/Reserves a 
situation mirrored closely by the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan, where the real effective 
exchange rate and commercial bank deposits also score high, with the addition of the current 
account for Kazakhstan.  
 In general, good scores are often obtained by the real effective exchange rate (REER), as 
in most of the recent literature, and the commercial bank deposits variables (supporting the 
view that banking, financial and currency crises are closely related). However, unsatisfactory 
scores are usually obtained by M2-based variables, domestic credit and the growth rate 
variable. According to historical observations, one can explain these results as follows. On 
one hand, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have experienced successful 
transitions through a liberalization of the foreign trade sector and a restructuring of their 
economy, which has increased their credibility vis à vis the financial markets. These reforms 
have contributed to attenuate the severity of speculative attacks on the local currencies. On the 
other hand, the economic growth that resulted from successful transition policies has been 
predominantly concentrated in services and the impact on the manufacturing sector has been 
limited. The bad performance of the GDP growth indicator might be due to the fact that an 
aggregate index of growth has an imperfect explanatory power. Further, the fact that ratios 
and growth rates have a lower explanatory power than variables expressed in nominal terms, 
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may partly reflect the fact that the inflation rate has a high signaling role for the financial 
markets. It is the successful policy of inflation moderation that renders exports more 
competitive in the foreign trade markets. It is the liberalization of prices that reduces the 
difference between domestic and world prices, thereby limiting the negative pass-trough 
effects on imports and economic activity. These effects contribute to increase the level of 
foreign reserves, thereby preventing the risk of a financial crisis.  
 
3. Composite indicator and the probability of a crisis 
 
 The next step is to combine the different macroeconomic indicators. This avoids placing 
too strong an emphasis on one variable in particular. Single indicators contain only partial 
information on forthcoming crises. In order to evaluate the forecasting performance of our 
indicators in tracking currency crises, we compute the following noise-to-signal ratio 
weighted indicator:  
 
   
∑
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SI *)/1( α        (7) 
where the index  j denotes a macroeconomic indicator, 
j
α  is the noise-to-signal ratio obtained 
for the indicator j and s is the signal variable defined above. The signal variable is weighted 
by the inverse of the noise to signal ratio, thereby giving more weight to indicators that 
reported low scores. The performance of this composite indicator can be tested using several 
criteria. Here, it is used to compute the conditional probability of a currency crisis : 
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 We evaluate the probability that a crisis will occur within h quarters (h=4 in this case), 
provided that the composite indicator is included within certain threshold values, 
L
I  (lower 
bound) and 
U
I  (upper bound). These bounds are determined exogenously and do not vary 
with time, but they do vary from country to country (according to specific characteristics and 
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the values of the composite indicator), permitting the establishment of more custom-made 
intervals for each country considered.   
 Once the upper and lower bounds have been determined, we then proceed to the 
calculation of the empirical conditional probability that a crisis will occur within four quarters 
given that the composite indicator is included within a certain interval. Here, the main 
difference between the pooling and country-specific approaches occurs in the computation of 
the conditional probability of a crisis. As a first step in the pooling approach, the composite 
indicator for each country is calculated based on the results of the pooling estimation, and 
then all of the composite indicator values for all countries are taken into account for the 
computation of the conditional probabilities (this is in contrast to the country-specific 
approach, where the values of the composite indicator for each country are considered 
separately). The bounds of each interval for the composite indicator also remain the same for 
all countries.  
 The results for these calculations are given in Table 9. For example, the conditional 
probability that a crisis will occur in Hungary within t+3, quarters given that the composite 
indicator at  t=1 takes the value 12, is 0,67 (country-specific approach).  
 When the composite indicators stemming from the pooling and country-specific 
approaches are compared, it is possible to observe that the pooling one gives higher 
conditional probabilities of crises at lower interval values, in other words, lower values of the 
composite indicator point to increased vulnerability (compare the graphs representing the 
composite indicators and conditional probabilities from the pooling and country-specific 
approaches in Figures 8 to 19). This result might seem contradictory to what was mentioned 
earlier, namely, that the pooling method is more restrictive than the country-specific 
approach. This, however, can be attributed to the fact that the situation in one country affects 
that of the entire group (as the probabilities are calculated for all countries at the same time), 
making these results less reliable. Conversely, with the country-specific approach we see that 
the calculations give reasonable and coherent results, in that in most cases the conditional 
probability of a crisis tends to increase monotonically with the value of the composite 
indicator, and tends towards 1 (certainty of a crisis) at very high indicator values. 
 Tables 10 (pooling) and 11 (country-specific) display simultaneously the value of the 
composite indicator for each period, the conditional probability associated with it, and the 
incidence of crises, for each country studied. Analyzing the behavior of the composite 
indicator in the case of the country-specific approach, we clearly distinguish two situations. In 
the cases of Hungary, Poland and the Slovak and Czech Republics, the highest probabilities of 
 14 
crises are obtained when a crisis is imminent, or when a crisis actually occurs. During the 
periods of non-crisis, the probability values remain relatively small. For Russia and 
Kazakhstan, the conclusion is slightly different. The probabilities are high for a longer period 
before a crisis (especially during the nineties). The warning system thus seems to perform 
rather well.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The warning system presented here could be refined by adopting approaches recently 
suggested in the empirical literature, for instance regime switching Markovian early warning 
systems (Arias and Erlandsson (2004)). However, defining an agenda whereby more 
sophisticated models have to be constructed, seems a difficult task in the case of Russia, given 
the degree of the spread and detrimental economic repercussions of the 1998 crisis. The 
current state of the macroeconomic fundamentals does not exclude a repetition of such a crisis 
in the future. A more promising approach would be to complete our early warning system 
with other standard approaches : value at risk analysis, logit/probit analysis, and event 
analysis. The greatest difficulty is to obtain reliable data over the period of the nineties, which 
reduces the number of potential indicators that can be used in the analysis.  
A general conclusion that emerges from this paper is the following. We have proposed 
a measure of the probability of crises associated to an aggregate indicator, where the 
percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals can be combined to give an 
appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this perspective, the important problem is 
not only whether a system produces true predictions of a crisis, but also whether there are 
forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis prior its actual occurrence. For purposes of 
prevention, policymakers need to have advance warnings in the medium/long-term rather than 
just a few periods prior to a crisis. Our system seems to perform rather well in this respect for 
most of the countries studied, but a future venue of research might seek to integrate an 
indicator for contagion effects to further improve the performance of an early warning system. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 : Data Description  
 
Indicators Definition and units 
1. Real exchange rates Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based) – Index number 
2. M2 Quasi-money – National currency – Millions, Billions 
3. Credit Domestic credit – National currency – Millions, Billions 
4. Reserves Total reserves minus gold – US Dollars – Millions, Billions 
5. GDP GDP, production – National currency – Millions, Billions 
6. Commercial bank 
deposits 
Demand deposits + Government deposits – National currency 
– Millions, Billions 
7. Imports Imports of goods and services – Millions, Billions 
8. Exports Exports of goods and services – Millions, Billions. 
 
Source : International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund 
 
 
Table 2 : Performance of Single Indicators (Pooling) 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number of 
Crises 
Called (per 
country) 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  
Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
 
Q1 
 
4 
0,0500 22,22% 0,9524 
M2 / GDP 
Q9 4 
0,7865 10,00% 0,5625 
M2 / Reserves 
Q10 1 
0,5000 4,44% 0,6667 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q6 13 
0,8634 44,44% 0,5479 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q4 13 
0,4770 58,89% 0,6795 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q1 28 
0,9629 87,78% 0,5267 
GDP 
Q4 13 
0,5000 57,78% 0,6667 
Growth 
Q2 7 
0,8449 25,56% 0,5476 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q1 4 
0,3409 20,00% 0,7500 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q3 10 
0,3636 48,89% 0,7333 
Source : Author’s Calculations 
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Table 3 : Performance of Single Indicators : Russia 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called
6
 
P(Crisis/Signal)
7
 
REER 
Q4 13 
0,07 83,33% 0,91 
M2 / GDP 
Q2 25 
1,02 75,00% 0,41 
M2 / Reserves 
Q1 28 
1,50 66,67% 0,32 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q8 7 
0,12 50,00% 0,86 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q4 13 
0,06 100,00% 0,92 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q1 28 
1,50 66,67% 0,32 
GDP 
Q4 13 
0,06 100,00% 0,92 
Growth 
Q1 4 
0,71 16,67% 0,50 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q4 13 
0,14 83,33% 0,83 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q4 13 
0,06 100,00% 0,92 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
Table 4 : Performance of Single Indicators : Hungary 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
Q7 22 
0,33 93,75% 0,79 
M2 / GDP 
Q4 19 
0,96 56,25% 0,56 
M2 / Reserves 
Q7 10 
0,49 31,25% 0,71 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q1 28 
1,33 75,00% 0,48 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q9 28 
0,85 100,00% 0,59 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q4 19 
0,41 75,00% 0,75 
GDP 
Q10 32 
1,00 100,00% 0,55 
Growth 
Q2 7 
0,92 25,00% 0,57 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q2 7 
0,31 25,00% 0,80 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q10 32 
1,00 100,00% 0,55 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
                                  
6
 This percentage can be computed as (A/A+C). 
7
 This probability corresponds to β, and is calculated as (A/A+B). 
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Table 5 : Performance of Single Indicators : Poland 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
Q2 7 
0,64 26,09% 0,86 
M2 / GDP 
Q8 7 
0,64 26,09% 0,86 
M2 / Reserves 
Q8 7 
0,64 26,09% 0,86 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q2 25 
1,13 73,91% 0,77 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q4 13 
0,32 52,17% 0,92 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q1 28 
1,21 82,61% 0,76 
GDP 
Q5 16 
0,55 60,87% 0,88 
Growth 
Q8 25 
0,81 82,61% 0,83 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q10 32 
1,00 100,00% 0,79 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q4 13 
0,32 52,17 0,92 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 : Performance of Single Indicators : Slovak Republic 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
Q1 4 
0,36 20,00% 0,75 
M2 / GDP 
Q8 7 
0,80 26,67% 0,57 
M2 / Reserves 
Q5 16 
0,36 80,00% 0,75 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q6 13 
0,48 60,00% 0,69 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q8 25 
0,84 93,33% 0,56 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q2 25 
0,61 93,33% 0,64 
GDP 
Q8 25 
0,84 93,33% 0,56 
Growth 
Q4 13 
0,67 53,33% 0,62 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q2 7 
0,80 26,67% 0,57 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q3 10 
0,27 53,33% 0,80 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
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Table 7 : Performance of Single Indicators : Czech Republic 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
Q3 10 
0,18 40,00% 0,86 
M2 / GDP 
Q8 7 
0,27 26,67% 0,80 
M2 / Reserves 
Q1 28 
1,07 93,33% 0,50 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q6 13 
0,32 66,67% 0,77 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q4 13 
0,32 66,67% 0,77 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q1 28 
0,99 86,67% 0,52 
GDP 
Q3 10 
0,46 46,67% 0,70 
Growth 
Q1 4 
0,36 20,00% 0,75 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q2 7 
0,43 33,33% 0,71 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q2 7 
0,18 40,00% 0,86 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 : Performance of Single Indicators : Kazakhstan 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold 
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal) 
REER 
Q2 7 
0,08 66,67% 0,86 
M2 / GDP 
Q1 28 
1,16 77,78% 0,28 
M2 / Reserves 
Q1 28 
1,16 77,78% 0,28 
Domestic Credit / GDP 
Q1 28 
1,16 77,78% 0,28 
Exports of Goods and Services 
Q4 13 
0,28 88,89% 0,62 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Q1 28 
0,96 88,89% 0,32 
GDP 
Q4 13 
0,28 88,89% 0,62 
Growth 
Q3 10 
0,68 44,44% 0,40 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP 
Q2 7 
0,08 66,67% 0,86 
Commercial Bank Deposits 
Q2 7 
0,08 66,67% 0,86 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
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Table 9 : Conditional probabilities of financial crises 
  
Pooling 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 2 0,3158 
2 - 5 0,2558 
5 - 10 0,5763 
10 - 25 0,9600 
Over 25 1,0000 
Russia 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 20 0,0000 
20- 40 0,0000 
40 - 65 1,0000 
65 - 80 0,8571 
Over 80 1,0000 
Hungary 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 5 0,1250 
5 - 8 0,5000 
8 - 11 0,7778 
11 - 16 0,6667 
Over 16 1,0000 
Poland 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 2 0,0000 
2 - 5 0,5000 
5 - 8 0,5714 
8 - 12 0,9231 
Over 12 1,0000 
Slovak Republic 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 2 0,0000 
2 - 5 0,1429 
5 - 10 0,5000 
10 - 13 0,6667 
Over 13 1,0000 
Czech Republic 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 2 0,0000 
2 - 5 0,0000 
5 - 10 0,5000 
10 - 14 0,8000 
Over 14 0,8571 
Kazakhstan 
Value of composite index Probability of crisis 
0 - 5 0,0000 
5 - 10 0,1429 
10 - 25 0,2500 
25 - 40 0,8000 
Over 40 1,0000 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
  
Table 10 : Summary Table : Composite Indicator, Conditional Probability and Incidence of Crises  (Pooling) 
  RUSSIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAK REPUBLIC CZECH REPUBLIC KAZAKHSTAN 
  Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence 
  Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises 
1996Q1 8,0301 0,5763 0 8,0047 0,5763 0 6,8464 0,5763 0 8,2134 0,5763 0 5,2547 0,5763 0 9,1883 0,5763 0 
1996Q2 6,8464 0,5763 0 8,0047 0,5763 0 6,8464 0,5763 0 4,0964 0,2558 0 5,2547 0,5763 0 6,8464 0,5763 0 
1996Q3 
6,8464 0,5763 1 
8,0047 0,5763 0 
6,8464 0,5763 1 
4,0964 0,2558 0 8,1880 0,5763 0 5,1349 0,5763 0 
1996Q4 7,8849 0,5763 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 6,8464 0,5763 0 8,0683 0,5763 0 9,2265 0,5763 0 5,1349 0,5763 0 
1997Q1 9,1883 0,5763 0 9,1883 0,5763 0 9,0686 0,5763 0 6,4383 0,5763 0 9,3717 0,5763 0 6,8464 0,5763 0 
1997Q2 9,0432 0,5763 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 7,8849 0,5763 0 6,2932 0,5763 0 
11,9765 0,9600 1 
7,8849 0,5763 0 
1997Q3 31,9765 1,0000 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 
7,8849 0,5763 1 
6,2932 0,5763 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 25,8849 1,0000 0 
1997Q4 
29,2265 1,0000 1 
6,2932 0,5763 0 7,8849 0,5763 0 6,2932 0,5763 0 
11,0432 0,9600 1 
26,3186 1,0000 0 
1998Q1 33,1602 1,0000 0 10,2268 0,9600 0 9,0686 0,5763 0 10,2268 0,9600 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 
28,0301 1,0000 1 
1998Q2 31,9765 1,0000 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 7,8849 0,5763 0 11,9765 0,9600 0 9,0432 0,5763 0 27,8849 1,0000 0 
1998Q3 
9,0432 0,5763 1 9,0432 0,5763 1 3,0385 0,2558 1 7,8849 0,5763 1 
7,0432 0,5763 0 
10,8183 0,9600 1 
1998Q4 
6,2932 0,5763 1 
4,1967 0,2558 0 3,1349 0,2558 0 
10,2268 0,9600 1 
10,2268 0,9600 0 10,8183 0,9600 0 
1999Q1 
6,2932 0,5763 1 
8,7482 0,5763 0 10,4102 0,9600 0 11,0432 0,9600 0 
10,2268 0,9600 1 10,8183 0,9600 1 
1999Q2 2,1967 0,2558 0 3,1349 0,2558 0 9,2265 0,5763 0 
4,9467 0,2558 1 
3,7885 0,2558 0 
4,1967 0,2558 1 
1999Q3 4,1967 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 3,7885 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
1999Q4 2,1967 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
1,0385 0,3158 1 
3,7885 0,2558 0 3,7885 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2000Q1 2,1967 0,2558 0 
5,1555 0,5763 1 
6,3137 0,5763 0 24,9467 0,9600 0 4,2221 0,2558 0 3,3804 0,2558 0 
2000Q2 1,0385 0,3158 0 
1,0385 0,3158 1 
5,1301 0,5763 0 23,7885 0,9600 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2000Q3 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 2,1967 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2000Q4 1,0385 0,3158 0 3,9718 0,2558 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2,2221 0,2558 1 
1,0385 0,3158 0 2,1967 0,2558 0 
2001Q1 2,2221 0,2558 0 5,1555 0,5763 0 4,6518 0,2558 0 3,4682 0,2558 0 2,2221 0,2558 0 2,2221 0,2558 0 
2001Q2 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 21,0385 0,9600 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2001Q3 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
3,4682 0,2558 1 
21,0385 0,9600 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2001Q4 2,2221 0,2558 0 
1,0385 0,3158 1 
23,0385 0,9600 0 6,4015 0,5763 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 5,1301 0,5763 0 
2002Q1 2,2221 0,2558 0 3,4936 0,2558 0 24,6518 0,9600 0 4,6518 0,2558 0 3,4936 0,2558 0 3,3804 0,2558 0 
2002Q2 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 22,1967 0,9600 0 
1,0385 0,3158 1 
21,0385 0,9600 0 2,1967 0,2558 0 
2002Q3 1,0385 0,3158 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 
2,1967 0,2558 1 
1,0385 0,3158 0 21,0385 0,9600 0 2,1967 0,2558 0 
2002Q4 1,0385 0,3158 0 25,9718 1,0000 0 1,0385 0,3158 0 21,0385 0,9600 0 
22,3099 0,9600 1 
4,1967 0,2558 0 
2003Q1 3,4936 0,2558 0 23,4936 0,9600 0 4,6518 0,2558 0 3,4936 0,2558 0 3,4936 0,2558 0 4,6518 0,2558 0 
2003Q2 2,3099 X 0 
22,3099 X 1 
2,1967 X 0 1,0385 X 0 21,0385 X 0 3,4682 X 0 
2003Q3 2,3099 X 0 1,0385 X 0 2,1967 X 0 1,0385 X 0 
1,0385 X 1 
3,4682 X 0 
2003Q4 2,3099 X 0 21,0385 X 0 1,0385 X 0 1,0385 X 0 2,3099 X 0 3,4682 X 0 
                   
Source : Authors' Calculations                 
Table 11 : Summary Table : Composite Indicator, Conditional Probability and Incidence of Crises (Individual Country Approach) 
  RUSSIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAK REPUBLIC CZECH REPUBLIC KAZAKHSTAN 
  Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence 
  Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises Indicator Probability of Crises 
1996Q1 72,2500 0,8571 0 4,9765 0,1250 0 10,3261 0,9231 0 6,3580 0,5000 0 13,0667 0,8000 0 10,3210 0,2500 0 
1996Q2 73,2308 0,8571 0 4,9765 0,1250 0 10,3261 0,9231 0 2,3758 0,1429 0 11,6667 0,8000 0 8,8395 0,1429 0 
1996Q3 
72,9167 0,8571 1 
4,9765 0,1250 0 
10,3261 0,9231 1 
2,3758 0,1429 0 11,6667 0,8000 0 9,0211 0,1429 0 
1996Q4 73,5833 0,8571 0 4,9765 0,1250 0 9,0870 0,9231 0 3,6202 0,1429 0 12,6778 0,8000 0 10,7495 0,2500 0 
1997Q1 83,8141 1,0000 0 6,0598 0,5000 0 12,0391 1,0000 0 7,2135 0,5000 0 14,4667 0,8571 0 36,9877 0,8000 0 
1997Q2 73,8974 0,8571 0 3,9318 0,1250 0 12,0391 1,0000 0 6,1091 0,5000 0 
18,2778 0,8571 1 
49,0211 1,0000 0 
1997Q3 72,9167 0,8571 0 3,9318 0,1250 0 
11,1522 0,9231 1 
4,4758 0,1429 0 15,9444 0,8571 0 31,2680 0,8000 0 
1997Q4 
74,5641 0,8571 1 
6,9787 0,5000 0 9,9130 0,9231 0 5,9691 0,5000 0 
10,3444 0,8000 1 
38,8976 0,8000 0 
1998Q1 84,4808 1,0000 0 9,1067 0,7778 0 12,0391 1,0000 0 15,3802 1,0000 0 15,9444 0,8571 0 
24,5185 0,2500 1 
1998Q2 83,0641 1,0000 0 6,9787 0,5000 0 12,0391 1,0000 0 11,0869 0,6667 0 13,7667 0,8000 0 50,7495 1,0000 0 
1998Q3 
83,0641 1,0000 1 3,9318 0,1250 1 8,9087 0,9231 1 10,5424 0,6667 1 
13,7667 0,8000 0 
49,8853 1,0000 1 
1998Q4 
61,8141 1,0000 1 
3,9318 0,1250 0 9,9130 0,9231 0 
15,3802 1,0000 1 
19,3667 0,8571 0 38,8976 0,8000 0 
1999Q1 
61,8141 1,0000 1 
6,0598 0,5000 0 12,0391 1,0000 0 14,1358 1,0000 0 
18,7444 0,8571 1 38,8976 0,8000 1 
1999Q2 10,8141 0,0000 0 10,4608 0,7778 0 8,9087 0,9231 0 
12,6424 0,6667 1 
1,9444 0,0000 0 
7,1939 0,1429 1 
1999Q3 1,3333 0,0000 0 10,4608 0,7778 0 5,7783 0,5714 0 10,5424 0,6667 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 2,7741 0,0000 0 
1999Q4 1,3333 0,0000 0 8,6662 0,7778 0 
2,7130 0,5000 1 
12,0358 0,6667 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2000Q1 2,3141 0,0000 0 
14,7942 0,6667 1 
5,7783 0,5714 0 18,1802 1,0000 0 4,7444 0,0000 0 5,1198 0,1429 0 
2000Q2 2,3141 0,0000 0 
9,4162 0,7778 1 
3,9522 0,5000 0 10,5424 0,6667 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2000Q3 1,3333 0,0000 0 9,4162 0,7778 0 3,9522 0,5000 0 6,8091 0,5000 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2000Q4 2,3141 0,0000 0 11,4844 0,6667 0 2,7130 0,5000 0 
9,5469 0,5000 1 
4,2778 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2001Q1 3,7308 0,0000 0 16,8254 1,0000 0 7,0826 0,5714 0 11,6469 0,6667 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 5,1198 0,1429 0 
2001Q2 2,3141 0,0000 0 8,6662 0,7778 0 8,6478 0,9231 0 6,8091 0,5000 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2001Q3 2,3141 0,0000 0 9,7108 0,7778 0 
8,6478 0,9231 1 
9,6091 0,5000 0 1,9444 0,0000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2001Q4 9,3974 0,0000 0 
11,7421 0,6667 1 
7,0826 0,5714 0 12,8913 0,6667 0 7,5444 0,5000 0 16,9717 0,2500 0 
2002Q1 3,7308 0,0000 0 13,5754 0,6667 0 8,6478 0,9231 0 11,6469 0,6667 0 14,0778 0,8571 0 5,1198 0,1429 0 
2002Q2 2,3141 0,0000 0 10,2656 0,7778 0 8,6478 0,9231 0 
4,4333 0,1429 1 
7,5444 0,5000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2002Q3 2,3141 0,0000 0 11,4474 0,6667 0 
7,0826 0,5714 1 
1,6333 0,0000 0 11,2778 0,8000 0 3,6383 0,0000 0 
2002Q4 2,3141 0,0000 0 15,7421 0,6667 0 5,8435 0,5714 0 4,4333 0,1429 0 
13,6111 0,8000 1 
3,6383 0,0000 0 
2003Q1 2,3141 0,0000 0 16,8254 1,0000 0 5,5174 0,5714 0 4,3711 0,1429 0 10,3444 0,8000 0 5,1198 0,1429 0 
2003Q2 2,3141 X 0 
15,7421 X 1 
3,9522 X 0 1,6333 X 0 6,6111 X 0 3,6383 X 0 
2003Q3 23,5641 X 0 11,3103 X 0 3,9522 X 0 1,6333 X 0 
10,3444 X 1 
3,6383 X 0 
2003Q4 16,4808 X 0 14,5603 X 0 2,7130 X 0 1,6333 X 0 10,3444 X 0 3,6383 X 0 
                   
Source : Authors' Calculations                 
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